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I. INTRODUCTION
The past two years have been a time of restructuring for the natural
gas industry, particularly for producers and pipeline companies. The
problems of the industry have affected the relationships of producers and
the mineral owners who granted them oil and gas leases. Although lease
and royalty problems are given little attention on a national basis, they
involve hundreds of millions of dollars potentially at issue between pro-
ducers and royalty owners.
II. LEASE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LOWER PRICES
Recently, a frequent topic of conversation among oil and gas attor-
neys has been whether their clients' leases are still in effect and, if so, for
how much longer. The problem is that falling oil and gas prices gener-
ally mean falling profits, and most oil and gas leases are drafted so that
they terminate when it is no longer profitable to continue to operate
them. The typical lease habendum clause provides for extension of the
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specific issues is brief.
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lease beyond the initial primary term as long as there is production.
Most courts interpret this reference to require profitable production.I
The rationale is that the oil and gas lease is a business transaction, so that
the parties intend that the reference to "production" should mean "pro-
duction in paying quantities."' Most states define "production in paying
quantities" as production sufficient that operating revenues exceed oper-
ating costs over a reasonable period of time,3 usually at least one year.
When, as over the last two years, there is a sharp and sustained drop in
price and wide-spread curtailment of production, lease termination
claims are likely to confront producers, particularly on leases with high
operating costs. Thus, producers have become very concerned with lease
savings clauses, particularly the shut-in royalty clause.
A. Savings Actions and Clauses
Many in the industry have chosen to ignore the legal problems
caused by falling gas revenues and to cross their fingers, hoping that their
lessors will not challenge the validity of their leases. That hope is con-
trary both to human nature and to the common law. Though mineral
owners may not move quickly to break leases when the market is de-
pressed, when prices of oil and gas eventually rise again, they will move
to challenge leases that have been unprofitable during the downturn.
Once a lease has terminated by failing to produce in paying quantities, it
generally cannot be revived by resumption of profitability, and a lessor is
ordinarily not barred by laches, waiver, or estoppel from asserting that
the lease has terminated.4 Furthermore, a lessor's acceptance of royalties
is not a basis for equity to bar lease termination, because royalties repre-
sent only a fraction of the production to which the lessor is entitled if the
lease has terminated.5
1. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 89, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1959) (citations omitted); see also
J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 173-77 (1983). For further treatment of the evalua-
tion production status of oil and gas leases. See Comment at 667 (current issue).
2. 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.5 (1987).
3. Id. See, e.g., Kerr v. Hillenberg, 373 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1962); Clifton, 160 Tex. at 89, 325
S.W.2d at 691.
4. See, e.g., Metz v. Doss, 114 I11. App. 2d 195, 252 N.E.2d 410, 412 (1969); Greer v. Salmon,
82 N.M. 245, 479 P.2d 294, 300 (1970). There are numerous cases, however, in which equitable
factors have been cited by the courts as a basis for refusing to find leases terminated. See 2 E.
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.14 (1964).
5. Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933).
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1. Governmental Action
Producers holding federal and state leases have persuaded the gov-
ernmental agencies in charge of leasing to amend their rules so that pro-
duction may be halted without loss of their leases. Thus, for example,
shortly after oil prices plunged in the spring of 1986, the federal govern-
ment set forth a procedure for granting lessees of marginally-producing
"stripper wells ' 6 a suspension of the production requirement.7 Some
state agencies have extended the time period under rules requiring that
nonproducing wells be plugged and abandoned after a certain period of
time, thus effectively extending nonproducing state leases.' Such actions
have substantially lessened the risk of loss of the lease for federal and
state lease holders, at least for those who have kept up with the deluge of
regulations and memoranda.
Solving the problem of failure to produce in paying quantities for
leases on private lands is not as easy. Governmental action will not pre-
vent termination of a private lease by the terms of the habendum clause
upon which the lessor and the lessee have agreed. At best, action by
government deprives lessors of the argument that state or federal law
requires lease termination. In addition, it may not be practical for lessees
to negotiate relief with their mineral owners becasue there are literally
millions of mineral owners and leases.
2. Lease Terms
Some producers may find the solution to their problem in the terms
of their leases. Most oil and gas leases contain a series of savings clauses:
the operations clause; the cessation of production clause; the force
majeure clause; the pooling and unitization clauses; and the shut-in roy-
alty clause. These clauses are intended to give producers flexibility to
deal with interferences with production by providing for specifically de-
fined substitutes for production.9 However, these savings clauses gener-
ally deal with complete failure of production as a result of physical
problems with the well or governmental intervention, rather than with
6. A stripper well is generally defined as a well capable of producing less than ten barrels of oil
per day or less than 60 MCF of natural gas per day.
7. Bureau of Land Management Instruction Memorandum No. 86-409 (Apr. 22, 1986).
8. See, e.g., Texas Statewide Rule 14 Emergency Amendment, TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16,
§ 3.14 (1985) (allowing operators of wells that became inactive after January 1, 1986, a full year,
instead of ninety days, to plug them or to put them into production again).




unprofitability as a result of production curtailments. If closely ex-
amined, they may not maintain leases in the face of falling prices.
a. Operations Clause
The operations clause in an oil and gas lease makes operations for
drilling or reworking a well the equivalent of production in paying quan-
tities.10 However, operations are not likely to be a viable alternative at a
time of low prices and high curtailments. While the courts are very lib-
eral in defining what constitutes "operations,"" producers are not likely
to drill additional wells or to rework existing wells when they cannot
profitably sell their production. Moreover, the operations clause merely
delays the inevitable: once operations are completed, the profitability
standard applies anew.
b. Cessation of Production Clause
While a cessation of production clause will usually extend a lease
after production ceases "from any cause,"12 the cessation of production
clause is invariably drafted to require additional drilling or reworking
operations to begin within sixty or ninety days. 3 A producer who is
already losing money from operations will not want to spend more
money drilling additional wells or reworking existing wells. Further-
more, some courts have held that the grace period of the cessation of
production clause begins to run at the end of any month in which lease
operations are unprofitable. 4 Under such an interpretation, the grace
period may have run before the producer realizes that its lease is
unprofitable. 15
c. Force Majeure Clause
Some producers assume that the fall of gas prices is an event beyond
their control that will trigger the savings provisions of the force majeure
clause. The force majeure clause is included in an oil and gas lease to
10. Id. at 216.
11. See, eg., A & M Oil, Inc. v. Miller, 11 Kan. App. 2d 152, 715 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1986)
(preparatory operations for drilling a slant well constituted "operations," though the drill bit did not
actually begin to turn and no activity took place on the leased property).
12. See, e.g., Texas AAPL Form 675 Oil & Gas Lease, 6 (Kraftbilt, Tulsa), reprinted hi E.
KUNTZ, J. LOWE, E. SMITH & 0. ANDERSON, OIL AND GAS FORMS MANUAL 20, 21 (1987).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., French v. Tenneco Oil Co., 725 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1986).
15. Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil & Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N,
117, 177 (1981).
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excuse performance and maintain the lease when a force beyond the con-
trol of the lessee and lessor interferes with performance.16 Courts gener-
ally interpret force majeure clauses in oil and gas leases strictly.17
Moreover, most force majeure clauses define only physical or regulatory
phenomena such as fires, floods, strikes, or governmental orders as force
majeure events, and excuse only the lessee's failure to perform lease cove-
nants. 8 Few leases specifically cover the possibility that a substantial
drop in demand will result in production surpluses and lower prices so
that the lessee will lose money if it opts to produce.19
d. Pooling and Unitization Clauses
Pooling and unitization clauses may permit producers to maintain
unprofitable leases by combining them with profitable leases. Pooling
and unitization clauses permit a lessee to hold a lease even without pro-
duction from the premises, so long as the lease is combined with a lease
that is producing profitably. 0 In theory, a lease that the producer does
not wish to drill may be pooled or unitized with producing leases and
maintained as long as there is profitable production from any well on the
unit. The pooling power must be exercised in good faith, however, and
the business judgment of combining profitable leases with unprofitable
leases is certainly subject to question.2 ' Historically, the purpose of pool-
ing and unitization clauses was to give producers the flexibility to con-
form operations to geologic realities or to the requirements of
administrative agencies, and not to maintain leases in a time of declining
prices and profitability.
e. Shut-In Royalty Clause
The shut-in royalty clause is the lease savings clause offering the best
chance for producers confronted with drastically lower gas revenues to
16. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 236.
17. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND
GAS LAW 186 (1986). See, e.g., Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Mingo Oil Producers, 628 F. Supp. 557,
561 (D. Wyo. 1986) (bankruptcy was not within the force majeure clause).
18. See, e.g., Texas AAPL Form 675 Oil & Gas Lease, 11, reprinted in E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE,
E. SMITH & 0. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 22.
19. The force majeure clause should preserve an oil and gas lease only if (a) the event com-
plained of is defined as a force majeure event, (b) the failure of performance is excused by the clause,
and (c) the event caused the failure of performance. 4 E. KUNTZ, supra note 4, § 53.5. The garden
variety force majeure clause neither defines market failure as a force majeure event nor defines a
failure to produce as an excused failure of performance.
20. E. KUNTZ, J. LOVE, 0. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 17, at 198.
21. See, e.g., Southwest Gas Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966); 4 H. WIL-
LIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 670.2 (1985).
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maintain their leases.22 The shut-in royalty clause gives lessees the right
to shut in actual production and substitute shut-in royalty payments to
lessors. 23 Again, however, the effect of the clause is likely to be limited.
Shut-in royalty payments must generally be made in strict compliance
with lease terms, and an inadvertent mistake will result in automatic ter-
mination.24 In addition, several courts have held that the clause can be
used only where a lease is capable of producing in paying quantities.25
3. Lease Amendment
Thus, for all its practical disadvantages, lease renegotiation and
amendment seems a far better option than reliance upon lessor goodwill,
governmental intervention, or boilerplate lease language. Despite the ad-
ministrative burden involved, many producers have successfully ap-
proached their mineral owners seeking lease amendments providing
specific periods of lease extension or liberalizing the restrictive language
of the habendum 26 or lease savings clauses.27 Even if prices for oil and
gas improve, producers with leases that have been only marginally profit-
able over the last few years would be well advised to consider amending
their lease terms as a safety measure against price downturns in the
future.
B. Shut-In Royalty Problems
For more than five years, the American gas industry has been con-
fronted by what was supposed to be an eighteen month gas "bubble." At
the height of the gas surplus, as much as fifteen percent of United States
gas delivery capacity may have been shut-in on any given day.28 Wide-
spread shut-ins have attracted attention to the limitations of typical shut-
in royalty clauses in oil and gas leases.
The lease shut-in royalty clause provides for "constructive produc-
tion" in lieu of actual production in paying quantities by permitting the
22. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
23. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 239.
24. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
26. For example, the habendum clause might be modified to define "in paying quantities" in
terms of (a) the capability of a specific volume of production or (b) the actual production of a stated
dollar value of oil and gas. See 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 4, § 26.7(b).
27. For example, the lack of a market price for natural gas that would permit the lessee to
produce profitably might be defined as a force majeure event, or the shut-in royalty clause might
specifically permit shut in when the market price will not permit the lessee to produce profitably.
28. True, Annual Gas Processing Report, OIL & GAS J., July 13, 1987 at 36.
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lessee to make shut-in royalty payments.2 9 Shut-in royalty clauses have
been included in oil and gas leases since early in this century because
drafters have recognized that natural gas cannot be economically stored,
and that there inevitably will be substantial swings in demand as a result
of weather changes and economic cycles.3" Unfortunately, however, the
adage that "for every draftsman there awaits an advocate" has proved
true, and shut-in royalty clauses have frequently ended up before the
courts.
1. Risk of Termination if Payment is Not Made Properly
One of the most frequent problems with shut-in clauses, and one
that has arisen frequently over the last few years, is what happens if a
shut-in payment is improperly made. Does the lease automatically ex-
pire, or does the lessee merely owe the lessor the shut-in payment? The
answer appears to depend upon the location of the property and upon the
precise terms of the clause.
In states like Oklahoma that follow the minority rule that "produc-
tion" means merely a capability of gas production (because the business
purpose of the lease is substantially performed when gas has been discov-
ered and a well prepared to produce), failure to pay a shut-in royalty
properly will not cause the lease to terminate.31 Since the lease is already
"producing," even though it is shut-in, the shut-in royalty provision is
regarded as a compensation provision, rather than as a substitute for pro-
duction. Breach of its terms subjects the lessee to liability, but not to loss
of the lease, unless it is clear from the lease terms that the parties in-
tended otherwise. This is also probably the law in Kentucky, Montana,
West Virginia, and Wyoming as well as Oklahoma.3" It apparently is
also the position in Louisiana because of the terms of the Louisiana Min-
eral Code, although the reasoning there is different.33
In most states, however, a failure to make a shut-in royalty payment
properly may cause the lease to terminate. 34 The determining factor is
29. Lowe, Shut-In Royalty Payments, 5 E. MIN. L. INST. § 18.02(1) (1984).
30. Id. § 18.02.
31. Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Okla. 1978).
32. Lowe, supra note 29, § 18.03(2).
33. Acquisitions, Inc. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The
court reasoned that the shut-in royalty was a royalty within the meaning of § 137 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, so that written notice of breach from the lessor to the lessee was required to support a
demand for dissolution. Id. at 1100-01.
34. Lowe, supra note 29, § 18.03. Texas, Kansas, and New Mexico are among the states that
apparently follow this view. Id.
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the precise language of the shut-in royalty clause which provides for con-
structive production when there is no actual production. Thus, the key
question in analyzing a shut-in royalty clause is what is the constructive
production? If the shut-in clause is drafted so that the mere existence of
a well capable of producing is the constructive production under the
lease, then an improper payment or failure to pay should not result in
loss of the lease. Even though the shut-in payment is not made properly,
the term "production" as used in the habendum clause will be equated by
the lease to the existence of a shut-in well on the premises. On the other
hand, if the lease is drafted so that the substitute for actual production is
a payment of shut-in royalty, as is the case with most shut-in clauses,
then a failure to make the payment properly will cause the lease to termi-
nate. If there is no actual production, and no substitute for production is
provided, there is nothing to maintain the lease.
The classic case illustrating the importance of the way the shut-in
clause defines constructive production is GulfOil Corp. v. Reid.3 Gulf's
oil and gas lease contained a shut-in royalty clause which provided:
"[W]here gas from a well producing gas only is not sold or used, Lessee
may pay as royalty Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per well per year, and upon
such payment it will be considered that gas is being produced within the
meaning of Paragraph 2 [the habendum clause] hereof....,36 Gulf be-
gan drilling a well on its lease a few days before expiration of the primary
term, and completed and shut-in the well shortly after the end of the
primary term. A month later, Gulf tendered the shut-in royalty payment
to the lessor, who rejected it. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
lease had terminated.37 The court reasoned that "[t]he lease lapsed as a
matter of law, there being no gas produced from the premises on the last
day of the primary term, and the royalty not having been paid on or
before that date."' 38 If there is no actual production and no substitute for
production, there is nothing to maintain the lease.
What can be done about this problem? Nothing short of amending
the shut-in clause or other lease savings provisions will maintain a lease
in the event of a failure to pay or an error in payment where the lease
makes proper payment the only constructive production. Payment of
shut-in royalty under such a lease is like sudden death overtime-one
mistake and it is all over. Many producers have their lawyers prepare
35. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 161 Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
36. Id. at 53, 337 S.W.2d at 269 n.1.
37. Id. at 55, 337 S.W.2d at 271.
38. Id.
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"shut-in royalty opinions" for each of their leases to give administrative
employees directions about how to make shut-in payments. Others have
added staff to their lease administration departments, despite company-
wide cuts in employment. These steps will help, but it is inevitable that
many producers will lose their leases.
In Oklahoma, one frequently sees a bumper sticker that implores
God to "give me one more oil boom." Motivated by faith that the boom
will come, and be followed inevitably by a bust that will once again make
shut-in payments important, the drafters of most lease forms prepared in
the 1980's have formulated shut-in royalty clauses that clearly provide
that failure to make shut-in payments will not terminate the lease. The
following is typical: "If... at any time.., there is any well on said land
... capable of producing oil or gas, and all such wells are shut-in, this
lease shall nevertheless, continue in force as though operations were be-
ing conducted on said land for so long as said wells are shut-in ....
Such clauses almost uniformly make the presence of a well capable of
production the equivalent of actual production from the lease.' Pay-
ment of shut-in royalty or rental is a compensation promise rather than
the factor that extends the lease. Many also contain specific savings lan-
guage excusing inadvertent failure to make payment. Due to better
drafting, improper payments under the shut-in royalty clause should not
cause nearly as many problems during the next economic cycle.
2. When the Shut-In Royalty Clause Can Be Used
There are two problems with shut-in royalty clauses that are not
likely to be solved by current drafting techniques: (a) the requirement of
a capability of production "in paying quantities;" and (b) the application
of the reasonable prudent operator standard to the shut-in clause. These
problems may open to question the validity of many leases that produ-
cers have shut-in during recent years.
39. Producers Form 88 (7-69) - Paid-Up, 3 (available from Pound Printing & Stationary Co.,
Houston). In fact, there is no case law directly upholding the proposition that a shut-in clause
drafted to make the existance of a shut-in well constructive production will preserve a lease against a
failure to make payments properly. However, that conclusion is suggested by the reasoning of Gulf,
supra note 35.
40. The author drafted an extensive shut-in royalty clause at Lowe, supra note 29, § 18.05(2),
which is offered as a basis for further discussion and drafting.
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a. The "'In Paying Quantities" Requirement
Though many producers are unaware of it, there is substantial pre-
cedent holding that the shut-in royalty clause in an oil and gas lease can-
not be invoked to maintain the lease unless the well is capable of
production "in paying quantities."'" This requirement substantially lim-
its the flexibility of lessees who would rely upon the shut-in clause to
maintain leases. It means, for example, that it will not be enough merely
to drill to a depth where a substantial show of gas is encountered and
then to cap the well until there is a market available or until the price
rises so that it is once again profitable to sell.42 In order to hold a lease
under the shut-in royalty clause, there must be a well on the lease that
has been drilled, completed, and equipped for production.4"
Perhaps the most difficult problem presented by the "in paying
quantities" requirement is one of timing where the clause is utilized in a
lease which is producing. When a producer chooses to shut-in a lease
that is producing, the "in paying quantities" requirement arguably must
be met at the time that the shut-in occurs. If the producer has ridden the
spot market down, hoping that there will be a price turnaround, a court
may find that the producer's lease has not been maintained by the shut-in
clause if the decision to shut in is made at a time when revenues are so
low that lease operating costs exceed operating revenues.
Of course, the "in paying quantities" concept overlaps with the rea-
sonable prudent operator standard. The premise should be that because
41. See, e.g., Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 662 P.2d 255, 258 (1983); Taylor
v. Kimbell, 219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951); Bixler v. Lamar Exploration Co., 733 P.2d 410, 412
(Okla. 1987); Hoyt v. Continental Oil Co., 606 P.2d 560, 564 (Okla. 1980). In Oklahoma, payment
of shut-in royalty is not necessary to maintain a lease. McVicker v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322
P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958) (a well capable of production in paying quantities is "producing" within the
meaning of the habendum clause). However, the issue often arises as to whether the lessee has the
right to pay shut-in royalty.
42. The rationale for such a limitation was stated recently by the Kansas Supreme Court in
Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 662 P.2d 255 (1983):
[A]lthough the shut-in royalty clause does not normally specify the shut-in gas well must
be capable of producing in paying quantities, such a requirement is implied. As noted, the
shut-in royalty clause is a savings clause allowing for constructive production. Such
clauses provide that upon payment of the shut-in royalty it will be considered gas is being
produced within the meaning of the habendum clause. In order to achieve the desired
result, namely a profit, production, whether actual or constructive, must be in paying
quantities.
Id. at -, 662 P.2d at 258.
43. Hoyt, 606 P.2d at 564. The logic of this rule is subject to question, at least where the
geologic characteristics of the potentially producing formations are such that the reasonable prudent
operator would not fracture the well until actually ready to produce (as some have asserted to the
author is true of the Mississippian Formation in Oklahoma). The lease should not be interpreted to
require the lessee to act imprudently to maintain it.
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an oil and gas lease is a business transaction, the lessee must act as would
a reasonable prudent operator under the circumstances. Thus, the mean-
ing of "in paying quantities" should be determined not by whether reve-
nues exceed costs when the shut-in occurs, but by reference to what the
future is likely to bring, and to whether the amount of production the
well is likely to produce would justify a reasonable prudent business per-
son in continuing to operate the property.' There is no "bright line"
distinction, however, so conservative lawyers are advising producer-
clients who expect to have to shut in wells to do so at a time while they
are still capable of producing "in paying quantities."
b. The Reasonable Prudent Operator Limitation
A second issue is whether the lessee must act as a reasonable pru-
dent operator in invoking the shut-in royalty clause. The answer may
substantially limit the availability of the shut-in clause to maintain oil
and gas leases.
A hypothetical case may clarify the problem. Suppose that the
Board of Directors of Independent Oil Company decides that the value
of gas in the ground is inherently greater than the current spot market
price and adopts a resolution ordering management to shut in any well
from which gas cannot be sold for at least $2.50 per MMBTU. May
leases that are shut-in be held by the tender of shut-in payments? At
issue is the breadth of the lessee's discretion in deciding when to shut in.
Is Independent Oil Company entitled to invoke the shut-in royalty
clauses of its leases whenever management decides it is advisable to do
so, or is it permitted to hold its leases by shut-in payments only when a
reasonable prudent operator would decide to do so?
There is little doubt that the lessee has a theoretical duty to utilize
the shut-in royalty clause in accord with the reasonable prudent operator
standard. That obligation permeates the lessee's rights." However,
most commentators have urged that the interests of the lessee and the
lessor in making the shut-in decision are virtually identical, so that the
courts should defer to the lessee's decision.46 Furthermore, most case
44. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 86-87, 89-90, 325 S.W.2d 684, 689-91 (1959); see also J.
LOWE, supra note 9, at 173-77.
45. The oil and gas lease is a business transaction in which the lessor gives to the lessee the right
to make operational decisions. Since the lessee acts for the lessor, a duty to act in good faith, compe-
tently, and with due regard for the lessor's interest is implicit. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 279-81.
46. See Lowe, supra note 29, § 18.04(1)(ii); Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to
Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 177, 190-
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law has recognized broad discretion in the lessee to determine when shut-
in is justified, at least where the lessee's judgment that production should
be shut in now (because prices will increase) turns out to be correct.
There are, however, cases that suggest that shut-in may be a prohibited
"speculation" where the lessee's judgment as to what the future will
bring proves to be wrong.47 Thus, those producers who have taken or
expect to take unilateral action to shut in gas production would be well
advised to build a record based upon more than the gut reactions of their
directors, however distinguished they may be, that natural gas is inher-
ently worth more than the price it will bring on the market.
III. ROYALTY PROBLEMS
A. Market Value Royalty
For nearly twenty years, natural gas producers have been con-
fronted with the market value royalty problem. It takes on a new twist in
the current market.
Many royalty clauses in oil and gas leases drafted before the mid-
1960's provide for a royalty based upon the "market value at the well of
gas sold or used." Beginning in the 1960's, there have been hundreds of
cases in which royalty owners have argued that the reference to "market
value" obligates their producers to pay a royalty calculated on the basis
of the market value of the gas when produced, which is what a willing
buyer and a willing seller would agree upon, even where that price is
greater than the price for which the lessee had agreed to sell the gas
produced under a long-term contract negotiated at arm's length. Of
course, lessees have argued that they should not be held liable to pay
royalty on a value greater than the price for which the gas is actually
sold. Their theory is that the interpretation of "market value" most con-
sistent with the implied covenant to market is that the contract price
entered into at an arm's length basis is the market value.48 In a majority
93, 200-01 (1976); Pierce, Lessee/Lessor Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, 8-9 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 564 (1939).
48. The clearest statement of this position is in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269
(Okla. 1981), where the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that "market value" was ordinarily
the "proceeds" actually received. The lessee is required by the implied covenant to market to sell
gas, and since gas has customarily been sold under long-term contracts, the lessee is forced to accept
such contracts. It would be unfair to the lessee to permit his profit to be whittled away, as would
occur if the lessee had to pay royalties on market value when prices were rising. Id. at 1273. On the
other hand, requiring a lessor to accept a share of whatever the lessee receives is not unfair to the
lessor, because the lessor is protected by the lessee's duty to make a reasonable sales contract. Id. at
[Vol. 23:547
LEASE AND ROYALTY PROBLEMS
of the states in which the issue has been considered, lessors have pre-
vailed.4 9 Generally, the courts have reasoned that oil producers are ex-
perienced in the industry, and accordingly their leases should be
interpreted to mean exactly what they say: "market value" is what a
willing buyer and a willing seller would agree upon at the time of the
production and sale.50
In the past, market value royalty litigation has always arisen in a
situation in which the alleged market value was greater than the contract
price for the gas produced. In the current gas surplus, the contract price
received by a producer for gas now frequently is greater than the market
value of that gas in the open market. For example, there are many con-
tracts executed in the early 1980's covering NGPA Section 102 or 103
gas under which gas is currently being sold at prices substantially above
current spot market prices. If gas is being sold at $3.50 per MMBTU,
but the spot market price is only $1.50 per MMBTU, can the lessee re-
quire that the lessor accept "market value," $1.50 per MMBTU or some
other price less than $3.50, as the basis for royalty calculation?
There is as yet no case law which deals directly with the issue.
However, the logic of the market value royalty cases suggests that in
those states which have concluded that "market value" may be greater
than the contract price, the lessor should be due only a royalty calculated
on the basis of "market value," even if that is lower than the contract
price. If "market value" means a price that a willing buyer and seller
would agree upon, then that standard should apply regardless of whether
it is advantageous to the lessor in a given fact situation." The parties
1274. This reasoning has been suggested by others. See Morris, The Gas Royalty Clause - What is
Market Value?, 25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 63, 79-83 (1974).
49. For a further discussion, see J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 263-67. The states that have adopted
the market value royalty rule (that a market value royalty may be based on a price greater than the
contract price) are Kansas, Texas, Mississippi, and (perhaps) Montana and North Dakota. It has
been rejected in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Id. at 266-67.
50. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985), is the classic case on point. In rejecting the lessees' argument, the
court said that "[iut is not the function of the courts, construing and enforcing contracts under
[Mississippi] state law, to intervene on behalf of producers experienced in the petroleum industry,
and thereby deprive lessors of their legitimate contractual expectations." Id. at 237. The court
described the market value royalty provision as a "business risk." Id.
51. This reasoning is implicit in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Piney Woods, 726 F.2d 225,
237. It is also implicit in the leading Texas case of Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.
1981), where the Texas Supreme Court noted that "[wlhen Exxon negotiated the [fixed price] gas
contracts, it took the risk that the revenue therefrom would be sufficient to satisfy its royalty obliga-
tions." Id. at 245. The reasoning of the Kansas Supreme Court in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221
Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977), is not so clear. To this reader, Lightcap




have clearly expressed their agreement, and the agreement should be
given effect.
In fact, few producers with market value royalty clauses in leases
and gas contracts with prices above the market have taken advantage of
the turbulence in the market to lower royalty payments. This hesitancy
probably results from a concern that it may not be wise to goad royalty
owners into suits that may raise other issues upon which lessees may be
more vulnerable. Those who have lowered royalty payments are keeping
quiet about it, hoping that their royalty owners will not realize that they
are being paid on a basis other than the price for which gas produced is
being sold.
B. Royalty Owners' Right to Share in Take-or-Pay Payments
Take-or-pay clauses in gas contracts, which require purchasers to
pay for gas even if they do not take it,52 lie close to the heart of the
problems of the natural gas industry. One of the reasons that natural gas
prices to residential consumers shot up in the early 1980's was that pipe-
lines took gas from high-priced sources rather than make take-or-pay
payments for it. Thus, consumers who could have been supplied with
cheap gas received expensive gas instead. Despite devices to avoid mak-
ing take-or-pay payments, pipelines now are confronted by what some
have estimated to be as much as fifteen billion dollars in take-or-pay lia-
bilities. Pipeline companies have not willingly paid most of those pay-
ments, so the courts in the major gas producing states are clogged with
litigation over the clauses. Billions of dollars have been paid in take-or-
pay settlements and damage awards. Billions more remain in dispute.
Take-or-pay liabilities are likely to be put to rest within the next few
years. Time is running out in the litigation process, and pipeline compa-
nies are losing most of the cases.53 Furthermore, the Federal Energy
52. A typical take-or-pay clause, taken from a mid-continent area contract, reads as follows:
Subject to the other provisions of this Contract, Seller agrees to sell and deliver and Pipe-
line agrees to purchase and receive, or pay for if made available hereunder but not taken, a
daily quantity of gas, average over each accounting period (contract quantity) during the
term hereof, equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the maximum quantity of gas that
Seller's wells can deliver to Pipeline ....
53. For a summary of take-or-pay issues, see Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate:
Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv.
185 (1987) reprinted in 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES DIGEST 192 (1987). See also Legg, Natural
Gas Contract Litigation in Oklahoma, 11 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 63 (1986); Medina, A Report from
the Battle Zone: The Take-or-Pay Wars, 58 OKLA. B.J. 2554 (1987), reprinted in 24 Pun. LAND &
RESOURCES DIGEST 268 (1987).
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Regulatory Commission has devised a regulatory scheme that will en-
courage settlement of claims. 4 With prodding from the courts, FERC
has required producers who wish pipelines to transport their gas to end
user or local distribution company purchasers to offer credits against
take-or-pay claims.
However take-or-pay liabilities are settled, substantial amounts of
money have changed hands, and much greater amounts will probably
pass in the next few years. The take-or-pay problem has been only of
academic interest for all but the small group of attorneys involved in
complex take-or-pay litigation or in related FERC proceedings. As take-
or-pay payments are made or take-or-pay claims are settled, however, the
issue of whether royalty owners are entitled to share in take-or-pay pay-
ments becomes increasingly more important.
The issue was raised in the context of a state lease in Pennzoil Co. v.
State." The lease royalty clause in Pennzoil provided that royalty was
due "on gas ... produced from said land saved and sold or used off the
premises .... "56 Further, the royalty payment clause provided that pay-
ment was due "on or before the twentieth (20th) day of the calendar
month succeeding the month of production and removal and sale of oil
and gas from said land. . . ,"7 On the basis of the language of the lease,
the state district court held that no royalty was due to Wyoming on take-
or-pay payments. Gas was not "produced" or "removed," so royalty
was not due, concluded the court.58
More recently, two cases from Louisiana involving federal leases ad-
dressed the same issue with radically different results. In Mesa Petro-
leum Co. v. United States Department of the Interior,59 a federal district
court followed much the same reasoning as the Wyoming court in
Pennzoil. The court held that royalties to the United States were not due
on take-or-pay payments received by Mesa from Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Company under the terms of an offshore lease from the United States.6"
54. See Associated Gas Distrib. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petition for cert.
filed, (Dec. 11, 1987); F.E.R.C. Order 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
§§ 2,284); F.E.R.C. Order 500-B, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,630 (1987); F.E.R.C. Order 500-C, 52 Fed. Reg.
48,986 (1987); F.E.R.C. Order 500-D, Doc. Nos. RM 87-34-000 - RM 87-34-053 (Mar. 8, 1988).





59. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 647 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. La. 1986).
60. Id. at 1355.
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Under the lease, Mesa agreed to pay the United States a royalty of six-
teen and two-thirds percent "in amount or value" of production saved,
removed or sold from the leased area.61 Subsequently, Mesa and Tennes-
see entered into a gas contract that provided for take-or-pay payments
and Mesa made the take-or-pay payments. The United States claimed
royalties. The district court granted Mesa's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that the United States was not entitled to share and that
the lease and the appropriate statutes and regulations require royalties
only on "production," which occurs only when natural gas is severed
from the ground and sold.62
In contrast, in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel,63 a fed-
eral district court concluded that the United States was due royalties on
take-or-pay payments. The court in Diamond Shamrock reasoned that
federal leases granted to the lessees the right to drill for, mine, extract,
remove, and dispose of oil and gas deposits." It concluded that "take-
or-pay payments are part of the revenue gained from the exercise of this
right or privilege" and should be subject to royalty.65 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the word "production" as used in the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Leasing Act and the Mineral Leasing Act means not only
the severance of oil and gas, but also the activities associated with main-
taining a working gas well where production is not taken.66 Because
take-or-pay payments are made in part to pay for the ongoing costs of
gas wells, the court reasoned, such payments are "production."67 Thus,
the federal district court upheld the order of the Department of Interior
requiring royalty on take-or-pay payments.
The conflict in these two decisions will ultimately be decided by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Whatever is the decision as to federal
leases, the issue will not necessarily be settled for royalty owners under
oil and gas leases on private lands. However, the two most likely lines of
reasoning are those taken by the district courts in Louisiana.
The best argument that lessors should not share in take-or-pay pay-
ments is the language of the royalty clause. Most oil and gas leases on
privately owned lands specifically provide that royalty is due on gas
61. Id. at 1354.
62. Id. at 1355.
63. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, No. 86-537, slip op. (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1987)
(WESTLAW, Federal library, Dist. file).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
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"produced... and sold.""8 Take-or-pay payments are not made for gas
produced; by definition, they are made in lieu of production. Therefore,
if the issue is decided by reference to literal lease terms, royalty owners
probably should not share in take-or-pay payments.
On the other hand, there are many cases in which courts, in inter-
preting oil and gas leases, have looked beyond the literal terms of the
lease to focus upon the broader general intent of the parties.6 9 The basic
agreement of the oil and gas lease is that the owner of mineral rights,
who does not generally have the equipment, the capital, or the expertise
to develop them, transfers the right to drill and produce to an oil com-
pany that supposedly does have the equipment, capital, and expertise to
develop. From that tacit understanding of the parties a variety of im-
plied covenants arise, including an implied promise of the lessee to mar-
ket within a reasonable period of time and for the best price available.7"
From recognition of an implied promise to market on the best available
terms to recognition of a right of a royalty owner to share in whatever
benefits are provided by the lessee's marketing efforts is but a step.7"
The likelihood that royalty owners will be held entitled to share in
take-or-pay payments will increase if the fact situation presented to the
court is one in which the lessee has received a settlement for take-or-pay
claims rather than take-or-pay payments themselves. Almost invariably,
where take-or-pay claims are settled, there are amendments to other pro-
visions of the agreement, particularly pricing and quantity provisions.
Where a payment is received in part for the lessee's tradeoff of favorable
pricing provisions or for lowering of the take obligations, even though
the settlement agreement clearly allocates settlement payments between
take-or-pay payments and modification of pricing provisions, the implied
covenant to market is likely to be triggered.7"
If royalty owners are permitted to share in take-or-pay payments,
the courts will almost certainly have to confront other unresolved issues.
68. See, e.g., Texas AAPL Form 675, 6, reprinted in E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, E. SMITH & 0.
ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 20.
69. The cases in which courts, like the Oklahoma Supreme Court, have rejected the market
value royalty rule are good examples. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
70. For discussion of the implied covenant to market, see J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 307-13.
71. One court has permitted royalty owners to intervene in a take-or-pay suit between a pro-
ducer and a pipeline. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Co., 455 So. 2d 1260 (La. Ct.
App. 1984). There has been no appellate ruling on whether the royalty owners were entitled to share
in any recovery, however. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Co., 490 So. 2d
1138 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
72. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist
Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), writ ref n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980)).
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For example, most gas contracts with take-or-pay provisions provide for
adjustment of the price when production which has been paid for but not
taken is ultimately delivered to the purchaser. Thus, if the price at the
time the take-or-pay payment accrued was $2.50 per MMBTU, but the
price has firmed to $3.00 per MMBTU when the production is actually
taken by the purchaser, the producer receives a compensating payment
from the purchaser. If the price has fallen further, the producer may be
required to make a compensating payment. How should the royalty
owner, who is not ordinarily a party to the gas contract, be included in
this scheme? The same logic that might require the producer to pay roy-
alty or take-or-pay payments should require the royalty owner to share
in adjustments, but what if the royalty owner has sold his interest, died,
or gone bankrupt? Because of the millions of royalty owners, such
problems would be difficult for the courts.
Industry practice is split regarding how to handle take-or-pay pay-
ments. Most attorneys have advised their clients to adhere to the literal
terms of their leases. On that basis, most oil companies do not share
take-or-pay payments or settlements with their royalty owners. On the
other hand, there is a significant minority that shares such payments,
either because counsel has advised them that they must, or because some-
one in management considers it fair.
Of course, the issue is not what is "fair," but what the parties in-
tended or would have intended had they considered the issue. Intention
is a close call that will be litigated in the coming years, greatly expanding
the numbers of natural resources attorneys interested in take-or-pay
payments.
IV. IMPLIED COVENANTS
In addition to the specific terms of oil and gas leases, the courts have
imposed upon lessees the obligation of complying with implied cove-
nants, which are unwritten promises that arise from the relationship of
the parties and the lack of detail in the typical oil and gas lease.73 Gener-
ally, producers are held to be obliged to protect a lease against drainage
and to operate diligently and prudently. If production is obtained on a
lease, the lessee is required to reasonably develop, to explore further, and
to market within a reasonable period of time at the best available price.
Failure to do what the reasonable prudent operator would do under the
73. For a general discussion of implied covenants, see J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 276-316.
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circumstances may subject the producer to lease cancellation or money
damages.
The current hard times in the gas industry have spawned increased
litigation over implied covenants. Mineral owners are as financially
pressed as producers and pipelines, and they have sought to pass the bur-
dens and relieve their frustrations through the courts. Suits claiming a
breach of the implied covenants to develop or to explore further present
little threat to the industry as a whole. The lessee's obligation is not to
drill when and where his lessors demand, but to act as a reasonable pru-
dent operator, which is essentially to do what a reasonable and prudent
businessperson would do under similar circumstances. With oil and gas
prices depressed, it is unlikely that the facts will frequently warrant a
finding that the standard has been breached in development and explora-
tion. Only the best prospects will be drilled in times like these. How-
ever, the diligent operation and the marketing and drainage covenants
are other stories. Producers face large potential liabilities in these areas.
A. FERC Rules May Trigger Covenant to Market Liabilities
When Ronald Reagan ran for President in 1980, one of his favorite
themes was that government regulations often cause as many problems
as they cure. Ironically, that may be demonstrated by FERC Order No.
451,7 which was adopted by the Reagan FERC in an attempt to move
further toward deregulation of the gas industry, and Order No. 500,71
which attempts to mitigate the huge take-or-pay liabilities confronted by
some pipeline companies. Order 451 was intended to substantially in-
crease American natural gas reserves and to offer natural gas pipelines a
first step out of the heavy take-or-pay liabilities they faced. At the same
time, the order represented an effort to push the gas industry an addi-
tional step toward complete deregulation.76 What Order No. 451 does is
to provide producers of natural gas, still regulated at low prices under
Sections 104 and 106 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, the right to
negotiate with their purchasers for higher prices.77 Of course, leases will
remain profitable longer if producers receive higher prices, resulting in
increased gas reserves.
74. F.E.R.C. Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986).
75. F.E.R.C. Order Nos. 500, 500-B, 500-C, 500-D, supra note 54.
76. For a comprehensive discussion of Order 451, see Shoneman & McConnell, FERC Order
No. 451: Freedom (Almost) for Old Gas, 7 ENERGY L. J. 299 (1986).
77. Order 451, supra note 74, at 22,219.
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The catch from the producers' viewpoint is that if a producer re-
quests renegotiation of prices for low-priced gas under Order No. 451, it
must also lay on the table for renegotiation its higher-priced contracts
covering similar gas.78 The theory is that the market will give pipeline
companies and producers incentives to trade off their current rights: pro-
ducers will trade high-priced contracts with hefty take-or-pay obligations
(that few pipelines are honoring anyway) for substantial increases in the
price of old regulated gas. Low-priced contracts will be negotiated to a
higher price more clearly reflecting the value of the gas in the market,
while high-priced contracts with heavy take-or-pay obligations will be
negotiated to a lower price.
However, FERC's drafters have placed producers in a difficult situa-
tion: Order No. 451 places gas producers in a position in which they
may be sued regardless of whether they take advantage of its provisions.
The problem is the implied covenant to market. For many years, the
courts in major oil producing states have recognized that the lessee under
an oil and gas lease owes a duty to its lessor to market lease production in
a reasonable time and at a reasonable price, which is the best available
price in the absence of compelling reasons to accept a lower one.7 9 In
applying implied covenants, the lessee's duty is to be determined on a
lease by lease basis.8" Thus, the lessee must obtain the best available
price for production from each of its leases.
The classic case requiring the lessee to obtain the best available price
is Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church.8 Amoco had entered
into a long term gas sales contract in 1969 covering several small leases
included in a gas unit.82 Because market conditions in 1969 were poor,
Amoco had to commit to the contract future production from undevel-
oped leases outside the unit, as well as the production from the leases in
the unit." In 1973, a well was drilled on another unit that included sev-
eral of the previously undeveloped leases dedicated to the 1969 con-
tract.84 By that time gas prices had climbed substantially, so Amoco
78. Id.
79. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 309.
80. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. 1981). The Texas Supreme
Court rejected Amoco's contention that its duty to protect the Alexanders against drainage should
be reduced because Amoco owed conflicting duties to other lessors. Id.
81. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979), writ ref n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
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negotiated an amendment to its 1969 contract which committed addi-
tional leases in the 1973 unit to the contract in return for an increase in
the contract price.
Though the renegotiated contract was obviously good business for
Amoco, it was not appreciated by lessors whose leases had been commit-
ted to the 1969 contract by the 1973 amendment. They sued for breach
of the implied covenant to market because the selling price of their gas
under the 1973 amendment was less than the selling price which could
have been obtained in the open market.86 The Texas courts held that the
implied covenant had been breached, because Amoco had gained a sub-
stantial improvement in the price that it received under the 1969 contract
by trading off the interests of its lessors.87
The application of the reasoning of First Baptist Church to the situa-
tion covered by Order No. 451 is obvious. A producer who chooses to
renegotiate low-priced gas contracts under Order No. 451 may be liable
to continue royalty payments to the lessors of leases subject to the higher
contractual provisions if it trades off the higher-priced contracts for im-
provements in low-priced contracts. Even the producer who decides not
to renegotiate under Order No. 451 may face liability. The producer
may be sued by the lessors subject to low-priced contracts for failing to
take advantage of Order No. 451 to market at the best available price.
Order No. 50088 exposes producers to the same liabilities. The Or-
der was adopted in response to the requirement of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC,89 that FERC address
the plight of pipelines confronted with take-or-pay liabilities.90 Order
No. 500 establishes an interim rule that a producer wishing to avail itself
of open-access transportation by a pipeline must offer to credit gas trans-
ported against the pipeline's take-or-pay obligations on a volumetric ba-
sis.9' In other words, a producer must be willing to trade take-or-pay
claims for transportation. Furthermore, if a pipeline has more than one
contract with a producer, it may select the contract to be credited. 92
A producer that agrees to transport gas under Order No. 500 may
well face suits by royalty owners whose interests have been damaged by
85. Id. at 282-83.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 287.
88. See supra note 54.
89. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 1044.
91. 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,352-53 (1987).
92. 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,353 (1987).
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the trade-off. The royalty owners will have strong cases; there may be no
benefit at all to the royalty owners since pipeline companies can select the
contracts to be credited. One contract may have take-or-pay liabilities
extinguished so that gas subject to another contract can be transported.
Even if the gas transported and sold is gas for which a given royalty
owner will be paid, there is a good argument that the implied covenant to
market is breached if the producer accepts a price less than the price
provided for by an existing contract.93
A producer that elects not to transport under Order No. 500 is not
shielded from liability either. It faces suit by royalty owners of leases
subject to contracts that would have been benefited had the producer
been willing to transport. The argument that transportation would have
exposed the producer to liability to royalty owners damaged by the take-
or-pay trade-off is no defense to a suit by those who would have been
benefited by transportation. The duty of the lessee to a particular lessor
is determined by the four comers of the lease, without reference to duties
that the lessee may owe to other lessors under other leases.94
Of course a producer can raise defenses such as force majeure and
preemption, and it can protect itself, at least partially, by inserting excess
royalty clauses in renegotiated contracts to obligate the pipeline to pay
any additional royalties for which the producer becomes liable.
95
Whether or not such devices will work remains to be seen, however, and
that will be established only after years of litigation. Order No. 451 and
Order No. 500 may be good ideas from an economist's viewpoint, but
they create unforeseen problems for producers. Many producers will say
that an imperfect regulatory system should have been left to run its
course.
B. The Implied Covenant to Protect Against Drainage
Nothing upsets an oil and gas lessor more than the thought that his
lessee is permitting his oil and gas to be drained away from under his
93. As has been noted, ordinarily the implied covenant to market requires that the lessee obtain
the best available price for the lessor. The best available price for high priced gas may well be the
price required to be paid under the existing gas contract.
94. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. 1981).
95. Whether Order 451 or Order 500 constitutes force majeure is uncertain, but it is unlikely
given the commonly encountered terms of oil and gas lease force majeure clauses. Whether the
federal rules preempt state enforcement of implied covenants is also uncertain, but is even less likely
in this writer's opinion; enforcement of the implied covenant will not interfere with the operation of
the rules, it will merely work a hardship on producers. An excess royalty clause may be difficult to
negotiate, but it should be effective.
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property. The complaining lessor has legal protection from the implied
covenant to protect against drainage. The courts have reasoned that
though the lease gives the lessee an option to search for, develop, and
produce oil and gas from the land during the primary term, the lessee
cannot stand by and watch the leased property be depleted by drainage.
If a reasonable prudent operator would drill an offset well to protect
against drainage, and it would be profitable to do so, the lessee must
either drill or pay compensatory damages to the lessor.
96
As has been discussed, many leases with gas wells are currently
shut-in or producing at a reduced rate. Still other leases with gas poten-
tial have never been drilled because of the unattractive economic climate.
In this situation, the potential for drainage by a nearby producer who has
a market is great. Gas will tend to migrate from a lease that is not pro-
ducing or is producing at a low rate to nearby leases that are producing
at full capacity.
1. The Effect of Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil
& Gas Board
The drainage problem is exascerbated by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas
Board.97 The Court held that the Natural Gas Act and the Natural Gas
Policy Act preempted the use of ratable taking orders by state conserva-
tion agencies against interstate pipelines. 98 Preventing drainage by or-
dering pipelines to take ratably from all who wished to sell would subject
interstate pipelines to a variety of regulation that would thwart Congress'
purposes in the NGA and the NGPA and would ultimately result in
higher gas prices to the consumer.99 The Supreme Court left open the
possibility that conservation agencies could act to prevent drainage by
regulating producers through prorationing orders.1" However, ordering
some producers to restrict production or shut-in to protect others against
96. For a discussion of the implied covenant to protect against drainage, see J. LoWE, supra
note 9, at 298-307.
97. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
98. Id. at 424-25.
99. Id. at 422-24.
100. Id. at 419 n.4. The Kansas Supreme Court has moved purposely into the opening left by
the Supreme Court, holding in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 732 P.2d
775, 780 (1987), that the Kansas Corporation Commission could permanently cancel unproduced




drainage will cost the state severance tax revenues and subject the conser-
vation commissioners, who generally are elected, to great political pres-
sure from those adversely affected.' Whether state conservation
agencies will have the political will to exercise the power left to them
remains to be seen.
Of course, the obligation of a gas producer is merely to act pru-
dently, not to insure its lessors against all losses. If the state cannot or
will not act to prevent drainage, it is hard to perceive a basis for conclud-
ing that the producer has breached its duty, at least if the producer has
tried diligently to alleviate the problem. Whether the producer has done
enough to meet the reasonable prudent operator standard, however, is
probably a question of fact. It is likely a fact issue that will usually be
resolved by juries against producers. At best, the industry will be em-
broiled in expensive and lengthy litigation.
2. Acceptance of Delay Rentals
Also relevant to the drainage problem are fundamental issues of
when the implied covenant applies and what must be proved. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed these problems in Rogers v. Heston
Oil Co., 102 which dealt with the problem of what happens if a lessor ac-
cepts payment of delay rentals under the terms of the lease knowing that
his property is being drained. Is the protection of the covenant waived?
Law professors have almost always argued that it should not be, claiming
that the purpose of the delay rental clause in the oil and gas lease is to
waive the implied covenant to test, not to give the lessee a license to
permit drainage.'0 3 However, there is precedent to the contrary," and
the issue has frequently forced premature settlement of suits.
In Rogers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court came down on the side of
the angels (and the law professors) on the issue.1°5 The court held that
acceptance by a lessor of delay rentals while his property is being drained
does not in and of itself waive his right to complain of drainage.10 6 To
101. See Note, Mississippi's Ratable-Take Rule Preempted: Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.
v. State Oil & Gas Board, 7 ENERGY L.J. 361, 369 (1986).
102. 735 P.2d 542 (Okla. 1984).
103. See, eg., J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 306.
104. See, e.g., Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 161 Ark. 26, 255 S.W. 37 (1923).
105. Rogers, 735 P.2d at 545. Texas also follows this rule. Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d
872 (Tex. Conm'n App. 1928), reh'g denied, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
106. Rogers, 735 P.2d at 545.
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reach its result, the court had to overrule fifty-year old precedent." 7 The
decision removes an illogical barrier to enforcement of the covenant to
protect against drainage. However, it increases the exposure to suit of
producers confronted by the current surplus of gas.
3. Burden of Proof
Rogers v. Heston Oil could have been worse for the industry, how-
ever, because in the same case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered
whether the lessor who is being drained by his own lessee should have a
lighter burden of proof in order to enforce the covenant to protect
against drainage. 10 8 Some commentators and a few courts have con-
cluded that a lessor who is being drained by operations conducted by his
own lessee ought not have to prove the probability that an offset well
would be profitable, either because the drainage is "fraudulent" or be-
cause it violates an implied promise by the lessee to do nothing to harm
the lessor.'0 9 However, most cases have concluded that absent bad faith
the lessee's only obligation to its lessor should be to act as a reasonable
prudent operator under the circumstances.110
In Rogers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the latter view. 1
The court said that the test of breach of the covenant is whether the
lessee, as a prudent operator, would drill a protection well on the lessor's
tract if the draining lease were owned by a third party.112 In other
words, the elements of proof of breach of the implied covenant to protect
against drainage do not change just because the alleged drainage is
caused by the royalty owner's own lessee. While this may be disap-
pointing to many lessor's attorneys, it is undoubtedly the more logical
rule. There is no special relationship of trust or confidence between the
lessor and the lessee under an oil and gas lease. 1 The lease is a business
transaction, and the lessee should not be required to protect it against
107. Id. at 544-45. The Rogers court expressly overruled Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels, 181 Okla.
218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937), and Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104 (1918).
108. Rogers, 735 P.2d at 547-48.
109. See, e.g., Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 983-84 (10th Cir. 1977); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 824.2 (abr. ed. 1986). The Cook case relieved the
lessor of the burden of proving the probable profitability of the offset well. Professors Williams and
Meyers urge that the lack of a probability of profitability should be an affirmative defense for the
lessee. Id.
110. The major cases are summarized in R. HEMINGWAY, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.3 (2d Ed.
1983).
111. Rogers, 735 P.2d at 544-45.
112. Id. at 547.
113. For a very recent affirmation of this principle, see Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, No. C-
3768, slip. op. (Tex. Dec. 15, 1987), overruling a court of appeals decision that a lessee owed its
1988]
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
drainage unless a reasonable prudent operator would do so in the same
circumstances. There is law to the contrary of Rogers on both of the
issues it addresses. However, it brings Oklahoma and Texas into accord
on these important issues,114 and their lead is likely to be followed by
other courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Lease and royalty problems in the gas industry tend to trail eco-
nomic and regulatory developments by several years. Notably, the most
important lease and royalty problems discussed above are only beginning
to wend their way through the courts. The current gas surplus, the mar-
ket chaos it has caused, and the regulatory responses to it are likely to be
ancient history by the time these lease and royalty problems are resolved.
Lease and royalty cases also tend to involve smaller amounts than
regulatory issues or producer/pipeline disputes. Litigation over the va-
lidity of a FERC order is potentially worth billions of dollars. Take-or-
pay suits often claim tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Pro-
ducer/royalty owner litigation seldom involves more than a few million
dollars in any single case.
Because of the huge number of persons and transactions involved in
these lease and royalty problems, however, they loom large for the gas
industry. There are millions of royalty owners, and tens of thousands of
producers and lawyers who may have to deal with them in the years to
come.
lessor a duty of highest good faith. The Texas Supreme Court found liability based on the reasonable
prudent operator standard.
114. Rogers, 735 P.2d at 544-45.
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